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-6 Transnational corporat:ions 
Dynamic structures, strategie~, ~nd 
processes* 
John B. Davis 
Introduction 
Transn~t:ional corporations (TNc::s) - also ,called '~~ltinational corporations, 
multinational enterprises, and. global corporations -' 'may be defined as firms 
that sell products in more thin one country: They sell in countries other than th~ir own both through exports' from th-ei~. home country l~cations and 
through sales from h;st country f~~eign affiliat~s (or subsidiaries) that have 
been created through the export. ~f capital 'or' foreign dir~ct' investment (FD I). 
According to the World Invest;;;ent Report 2002, TNCs no; number some 
65,000 firms, and'are:~ssociated with ab~~t 850,00'0: afftliates worldwide, 
with the w~rld's' lOa'largest ~on::'financial TNCs acco~nting for more than 
half of total sales 'of all foreign affiliates (UNCT'AD 2002). The emergence of 
TNCs a~ a central f~rcein th~ glob'ali~ation p~~c~ssof the last tw~ decades is 
closely. tied to two developments,' one a co'nseciu~nce of a long-term histor-
ical, technological evolution and the other a consequence" of institutional 
change in the world economy largely initiated and carried ou~ by a small 
number of advanced economy nations. The first is simply the continuing but 
recently. more .dramatic fall in goods transportation and' infoI111ation transfer 
costs. The _ second is the determination in the 1980s by many, in the largest 
advanced economies to initiate an international financial, liberalization. To 
understand the latter as a unique historical event' that, occurred against the 
backdrop ,of the former, the history leading up. to the financial liberalization 
of the 1980s needs to be briefly reviewed.-
Free capital movements had been excluded from the postwar Bretton 
Woods regime, which secured the principles of a liberal international trading 
regime after the disaster of interwar national protectionist policies, combined 
with a rescue system for ,countries in balance of payments difficulties in the 
fornl of the International Monetary Fund. Without the free flow of capital 
internationally, countries :were able to peg their exchange rates, and freely 
pursue full employment policies and the -expansion. of the welfare state, 
effecting a temporary labor--capital accord with rising ,real wages linked to 
productivity growth, profits for industry, and increased social services. The 
breakdown of Bretton Woods - symbolized by US President Richard 
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Nixon's 1971 abandonment of dollar-gold convertibility - came about as a 
result of the US attempt to maintain both the "Great Society" war on 
poverty and wage war in Vietnam, and also because of the rising competi-
tiveness of the Japanese and European economies that undermined the 
postwar US trade advantag~ and balance of payments surplus. However, 
when exchange rates became flexible and free-floating, firms engaged in 
international trade found it necessary to hedge their foreign exchange posi-
tions against fluctuation in currency values. This necessitated liberalizing 
short-tenn international capital flows, without which the expanded level of 
postwar international trade would have been jeopardized just as surely as if 
there had been a new era of protectionism. 
But the broader logic of the situation did not escape the leadership oflarge 
national corporations. If one moved financial capital into foreign exchange 
positions as a hedge against loss in value of one's exports and imports, then 
one should also move production" capital ir'Ito foreign locations as a hedge 
~gainst loss in value of one's national op'erations. Thus corresponding to 
short-ternl international capital flows there should also be long-term inter-
national capital flows. In part this co'nj~~cti~~ came about because capital is 
fungible. Attempts at regulation were not likely to have been entirely suc':' 
cessful in discriminating trade-financing ~apital movements from long-term 
capital movements. But more important was'the recognition on the part of 
those in large national corporations that signific'ant profit opportunities wer~ 
available from relocating production to morecoimtries: These were associ-
ated with being able to selectively dominate market~ in new natio·nal1~)(;a . .!. 
tions when acquiring "local" reputation, tying' supplier' networks more 
closely to final goods markets, escaping costly home 'couritry reg~latoiy struc-
tures while seeking regulatory concessions as a p'ait 'of for~ign·location,trans.:. 
fonning bargaining conditions at home '::arid' simultaneously gaining 
advantages elsewhere by relocating to countries'wherelab~r was either 
weakly organized or not organized at all, and gaining political influeri'ce 'vis-
a-vis government authorities in foreign: locations in" which I national 
economies were small relative to the TNC.' ", "', ' ',,: 
; The second section of this chapter b~iefly reviews recent evidence con-
cerning the importance of TNCs and their foreign affiliates in'the world 
econo~y, including evidence regarding the ext~ntof FDI which firms carry 
o~t in establishing foreign operations and achieving multinational status. The 
thIrd section distinguishes four competing theories' of TNCs: the market 
powe~ appro~ch, the transactions cost internalization approach, the Dunning eclec~lc paradIgm, and the technological accumulation approach. Section four 
exammes five transfonnational impacts that TNCs have had or may continue 
to ha~e on the world economy in the future in' the spread of their global 
0peratl?ns. ,The final section provides concluding remarks on national sover-:-
eignty Issues and the possible future role of TNCs in the world economy. )'1 
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Evidence on TNCs and their foreign affiliates 
. .. 
One measure of the increasing importance of TNCs is the increased share of 
sales in world markets by their foreign affiliates. Rather than sell goods from 
home locations, since the mid-1980s TN Cs have increasingly sold them from 
foreign locations, both in host country markets themselves ,where they have 
established production and distribution affiliates, and in 'the form of exports 
from these new locations. Whereas in 1990' the sales of foreign affiliates of 
TNCs were about equal to world exports, in 2001 sales cifTNC foreign affil-
iates were almost twice as high as world exports. Over this same period the 
stock of outward FD I creating foreign affiliates increased from $1.7 trillion to 
$6.6 tri~ion. Foreign affiliates of TNCs now'acc,ou~ft for one~third 'of world 
exports and one-tenth of world GDP' (UNCTAD 2002).1 Table 6.1 shows 
the value of sales, gross product, total assets:~nd exports offoreign affiliates in 
constant prices for the years 1982', 1990, and 2001." . . " " ," , 
.This increased role for TNC foreign affiliates reflects broad change~ in the 
world e~onomy, in the 'relationships between natior;al economies, trade, and 
FDI since the mid-1980s .. Whereasfrom the 1970s to 1985 the growt~ rates 
of trade, FDI, and world GDP w~~e similar, since then the growth rate of 
trade has ;ignificantly exceed~d 'th~' growth rat~o(world GDP, whil~ the 
growth rate of FDI 'has significantly exceededthegrowth rate of trade (Table 
6.2). Thismea~s that 'not o~ly are national economies becoming more glob-
alized in that' nati~nal firms incr~asingly produce for export; but they are also 
becoming more glob~lized in that foreign firms are increasingly involved in 
countries: export and domestic markets. TNCs have thus not only substituted 
expanded exports for' further growth in domestic sales, but they have. also 
substituted expanded sales by their foreign affiliates for further growth in 
exports. Thl.ls a world economy previously made up of nations engage?)n 
production an'd' trade through domestic firms is more and more ~e~ng 
replaced by a world economy made up of TNCs engaged in production~nd 
trade with one another across nations. Beside the old model of trade between 
nations we now have a new model generally referred to as one involving a? 
international system of productio? . ' 
Table 6.1, F~;eig~ aai~iates sales"gro~sproduct, tot~l ~ssets, ?Xports and employment, 
.1982, 1990, 2001(constantprices, US$ bIllIOn or OOO.workers) 
Sales of foreign affiliates .! 
Gross product of foreign affiliates; 
Total assets of foreign affiliates 
Exports of foreign affiliates 
Employment of foreign affiliates ('000) 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2002: 4). 
1982 
2541 
,. 594 
1959 
670 
17,987 
1990; 2001 
.5479 18,517 
1423 3495 
5759 ". • 24,952 
1169 2600 
23,858 ~',' 53,581 
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Table 6.2 FDI, GDP, and export growth rates (percentage) 
Item 
FDI inflows 
FDI outflow~ , 
GDP (in curre~t prices) ,. 
Exports 
1986-1990 
23.6 
24.3 
11.5 
, 15.8 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2002: 4). 
1991-1995 
20.0 
15.8 
6.5 
8.7 
1996-2000 
40.1 
36.7 
1.2 
4.2 
When' corporations establish foreign affiliates, they do so through FDI, 
either by creating entirely new facilities (termed greenfield investment) or, 
more commonly, by purchasing existing firms andlor existing facilities 
through inergersand' acquisitions (M&A). For 1999, the latter form consti-
tuted over 75 percent of total FOI, most of which was in the form of acquisi-
tions"rather than mergers, and two-thirds of which involved TNCs acquiring 
100 percent interest in the acquired firm (UNCTAD 2000).2 Thus when 
TNb l~catein oth~~ countries,'they generally fully acquire existing national 
finns. ~ This, provides them with established production andlor distribution 
systems, . ~ncluding ~upplier' networks: and, any history of regulatory com-
pliance. It also generally involves' them' taking over acquired firms' employees 
together with a history of the acquIred firm;s past labor agreements and 
expectations of managemen't regarding thoseagreem'ents:3 In this way, TNCs 
acquire earnings streams additional tothose'fro'mtheir existing production, 
and - should they choose to introduce the~ir own'ptoducts alongside the con-
tinued ma~ufacture and sale of acquired firms' pro'du~ts- they also gain the 
opportunity to produce and distribute thei~ 'prod~cts' where they may h~ve 
been unable to do so before, either be~~use oft;dff;nd!non-tariffstructures, 
brand recognition problems, andl or th~ abilitY ~f host' countrY" firms to 
exclude competition from foreign firm~.Th~s e~pansion'in 'other ,countries 
constitutes. a broad-based strategy for TNCs long-term development the 
logic of which is likely to be sustained in thef~ture. " 
TNCs are often ranked according to total foreign assets, since this gives an 
indication of the scope of their reliance on foreign affiliates. liut a preferred 
measure of TNC multinational status, provided by the United Nations Con-
ference' on Trade and Development· (UNCT AD), . is the transnationality 
in~ex (TNI) which is calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign assets 
to total assets, foreign sales to total sales, a'nd foreign employment to total 
employment (UNCTAD 2002). To'seewhat the index involves (see Table 
6.3), note that Vodafone, the UK telecommunications TNC was ranked first 
in 2000 in terms of total foreign assets, but fifteenth according to its TN!. 
Also, General Electric, the US electncal and electronic equipment TNC, was 
ranked second in 2000 in terms of total foreign assets: but 'only seventy-third 
according .to its ~NI. TNCs, then, that are simply'very large 'in size,' have 
many foreIgn affilIates, and have commensurately large foreign assets, may be 
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Table 6.3 The world's top 10 non-financial TNCs, 2000 
Ranking by Ranking by Corporation Home Industry 
foreign TNI economy 
assets 
1 15 Vodafone UK telecommunications 
2 73 General Electric US electrical and electronic 
equipment 
3 30 Exxon/Mobil US petroleum expl.!ref.! dist. 
4 42 Vivendi/Universal France diversified 
5 84 General Motors US motor vehicles 
6 46 Royal Dutch/Shell UK petroleum expl.! ref.! dist. 
7 24 BP UK petroleum expl.! ref.! dist. 
8 80 Toyota Motor Japan motor vehicles 
9 55 Telef6nica Spain telecommunications 
10 47 Fiat Italy'! . motor vehicles 
. , 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2002: 86). 
less integrated into the global economy relative to their size than smaller finns 
when affiliate sales and employment are' considered. ,This is important for 
thinking about the internal culture and global view of different TNCs, since 
TNCs that have high' TNls probably. have accumulated considerable 
experience in' regard' to' how to carry' out operations in' host countries. Con-
versely, very large TNCsin terms of total foreign assets but with compara-
tively less extensive foreign sales and employment experience may be misled 
by their sheer size and tend to; underestimate what is involved in foreign 
operations. ' "" 
Competing the~rie~' of TNCs 
There are four main explanations of the nature arid behavior ofTNCs: 
a the market power approach; 
b ' the transactions cost internalization approach; 
c the Dunning eclectic paradigm; and 
d the technological accumulation approach. 
Mar~etpower approach 
Steven Hymer's 1960 MIT PhD dissertation initiated theoretical investigation 
into TNCs and FDI (Hymer 1960). Hymer argued that neoclassical capital 
arbitrage theory of portfolio flows was inadequate for explaining the behavior 
ofTNCs as firms and consequently also the long-term capital flows that these 
firms carried out.' He focused on firms' efforts to acquire market power, and 
argued that,. while firms increase their share of domestic markets in the early 
stages of growth by means of mergers and extension of capacity, at some 
i , 
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point they begin to invest monopoly profits earned at home in foreign opera-
tions~ They· thus strive' to transfer the levels of concentration they have 
achieved domestically to foreign markets. Hymer's focus on firms helped to 
generate a new, interdisciplinary field of international business studies that 
emphasized realism and evidence, and amounted to an attempt "to escape the 
intellectual straitjacket of neoclassical-type trade and financial theory" 
(Dunning and Rugman 1985: 228). On this view, TNCs had two motiva-
tions for carrying out' FDI. One was to try to reduce or eliminate inter-
national competition; and thereby establish monopoly advantages on a global 
basis. The other was to increase the returns ,from the particular advantages 
that they already possessed in home country markets through the creation of 
cost-reducing supplier networks that further increased monopoly profits. 
Charles Kindleberger interpreted Hymer's thinking more in terms of the 
industrial organization tradition, employing the traditional struct~re-conduct­
performance model of markets (Bain 1956). TNCs are seen to arise in certain 
types of market structures, and are less seen as agents involved in oligopolistic 
interaction actively creating barriers to entry and colluding with other firms 
in their industries. As he put it, "The nature; of monopolistic advantages 
which produce direct investment can 'be indicated under a variety of headings 
- departure from perfect competition in: goods, markets,' departure from 
perfect competition in factor markets, internal or external economies of scale, 
government limitations on output or entry" (Kindleberger 1969: .13). Kindle-
'berger then added to this the idea that TNCs were engaged iri monopolistic 
competition over differentiated product~. Partly this' change in focus reflected 
a change in the status quo. When Hymer first wrote, the main question to 
answer was why national firms located operations abroad: Twenty':"fiveyears 
later attention had shifted to how to analyze the advantages of TNCsalready 
operating abroad as well as the way in which international production 
systems were being organized. 
One interesting side to Hymer's work is that he was particularly critical of 
TNC activities in developing nations, arguing that TNC activity led to a 
"Law of Uneven Development" in which host countries' interests were sub-
ordinated to the interests of advanced nations (Hymer .1972r, But the reality 
in the postwar period was that most FDI was directed toward the advanced 
countries. Whereas hvo-thirds of the world's stock ofFDI had been located 
in developing countries in 1938, by the '1970s this share had fallen to about a 
quarter (Dunning 1983). This meant that much subsequent research on 
TNCs and FDI focused on the operations of firms in more well-established 
mark~ts. This produced a change in the kinds of explanations offered to 
explal~ TNC behavior and motivations" with the' internalization approach 
emergmg as the leading view - associated with Richard Caves,· Raymond 
Vernon, Alan Rugman, Peter Buckley: and Mark Casson. ',' " ' 
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Transactions cost internalization approach 
The internalization approach drew on the transactions cost theories of 
Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, and focused o~'tf';eefforts that fir~ls 
made to become more efficient by minimizing transaction~ ~osts involved in 
international activities. The transactions cost frame~ork constitutes a criticism 
of neoclassical economics that explains trade,and in~~stme~tsolelyin temlS of 
exchange between independent individualS and/ or groups of individuals. On 
the transactions costs view, when the, ~~sts of administered exchange are 
lower than those of arm's-length market e:Xchange, the market is intenlalized 
anci efficiency enhanced. Particulariy costIy to exchange ina'mi's-length 
transactions are intangible assets such 'as technology. Tr;msactions involving 
technology acquisition are internalized when firms in~est, in or' bu)! R&D 
facilities of other firms jn other countries: Here technology is treat~d as being 
akin to information or potentially', public knowledge, which 'is only one 
dimension it may assume (Can~ell 1994). Another importantdinlension of 
technology are those tacit capabilities thatacc~:lInulate and becom~ el~lbeddcd 
in firms through collective learning pro~esse~. TNCs that acquire technology 
in this sense typically maintain acquired. finns' ~&D facilities. relatively intact 
to preserve and utilize their embedded technologies. The savings involved 
stem from not having to buy technologies on open markets but rather in 
coordinating their development and use through administrative methods. 
In the transactions costs approach, TNCs aredefined ascost~minimizing 
organizers of non-:-market transactions, and: opportunities, for' creating ,new 
internal "markets" constitut~ the ~verriding motivation for the growth of the 
firm. However" proponents 'af the internalization approach also, recognize 
that TNCs mayseek to raise profits by restricting competition, and that this 
may offset the efficiencies associated with overall cost minimization . .":Welfare 
losses arise. where multi~ationals maximize monopoly. profits by restricting 
the output of ... !goods and services ... where vertical integration is used as a 
barrier to entry ... [and] because they provide a more suitable mechanism for 
exploiting an international monopoly than does a cartel" (Buckley 1985: 
119). Nonetheless the internalization approach generally pays less attention to 
the structure of the final product market in order to focus on more efficient 
exchange of intennediateproducts, and thus ultimately'shares relatively little 
with the Hymer market power approach. Indeed, most of the proponents of 
the internalization approach believe that markets are competitive. One influ-
ential individual who nonetheless attempted to combine the two frameworks 
is John Dunning, whose. approach has come to be known as the eclectic 
paradigm. '> , 
Dunning eclectic paradigm 
Dunning reasoned in terms of a combination of different types of "advan-
tages" which he believed TNCs sought to act on in foreign locations, and 
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argued that the different questions one might have about TNCs made atten-
tion to one or another of these advantages relevant. Thus, the advantages of 
i~ternalizationweremost relevant when concentrating on backward linkages, 
vertical integTation, and resource extraction, whereas the advantages of exer-
~ising market power were more relevant when one considered TNCs strat-
egies for co~p'eting in final go()ds markets. Dunning distinguished primarily 
bet~~en competitive or "ownership" advantages which TNCs had vis-a-vis 
their m:ajo~ rivals - such as are 'attributable to ownership of intangible assets 
(entrepre'~eurial capabilities of managers, reputation and credit worthiness, 
long':'term business agreements with other firms, political contacts, etc.) - and 
internalization' advant~ges '- such as are associated with how more integrated 
firms are able toc:oordlnate 'and better realize returns on networks of 
complementary assets in different countries. That Dunning offers an organ-
izing framew()rkrather th~n a particular theory of TNCs means that he does 
rlot presuppos~' any specific 'theory of the firm or definite view of the nature 
6(competitiori. How'ever;his owri view is that competitionamongTNCs is 
generally more important than collusion among them: "It is not the orthodox 
type of monopoly advantages which give the enterprise an'edge over its rivals 
- actual or potential ~ but the advantages which accrue through intemalisa-
tion" (Dunning 1988: 32).' ," 
Technological accumulation approach 
In the technological accumulation approach TNCs are seen to be in long-run 
technological competition with on~ anoth~r; and the development of 
technology itself is seen to be acumulative process (Cantwell 1989). Techno-
logy development is a slow, painstaking process that depends upon co'ntinual 
interaction between the creation of new technologies and' their use in' pro-
duction. This means that though firms in any given industry are likely to 
have fairly similar lines of technological development, the particular lines of 
deve~opment they each pursue are nonetheless unique and differentiated. 
That is, progress takes place in technological "silo·s". Thus in order to diver-
si~ their tec?nological development TNCs use FDI to become global orga-
mzers of entIre international technology networks that combine different but 
complementary technology streams from different firms' and industries. In this 
~es~ect, the technological accumulationapproach is different from intemal-
I~atIOn theo~ which. also. has been used to explain technology acquisition, 
SInce the pnmary object In this instance is not static efficiency gains in a 
mark.et for technological knowledge but rather processes of innovation and 
learnI~g across interlinked R&D centers that as a whole explain the general 
evolutIOn of technological knowledge. 
The technological accumulation approach can also be contrasted 
with Hymer's market power h' h h . ,'.' approac In t at t e growIng connectIons 
between technolooies produc .'. hI' ' . 
o' es an IncreasIng tec no oglcal Interrelatedness 
between TNCs that can be thought to heighten the intensity of competition 
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between them. One way in which this comes about is in the· tendency for 
TNCs to be attracted to the same leading international centers of innovation 
where they then compete for the same resources. Collusive agreements in 
such circumstances tend to be temporary and .. ' unstable, and competition 
through the development of rival technologies may ultimately manifest itself 
in the form of product differentiation. The. view, then, that market power 
and oligopolistic competition explains TNC behavior may better reflect the 
earlier postwar experience when FDI was more devoted to the production of 
standardized products in new national locations, and there were fewer TNCs 
in competition with one another. For the last. two" decades" however, the 
more rapid pace of technology change, combined with ever greater product 
differentiation tailored to end-users, seems to· have led to heightened 
competition between TNCs on multiple levels. 
Five transformational impactsofTNCs on tlle.world 
economy " "., 
The relatively rapid extension of the number of TNCs, their affiliates, and 
extension in the scope of their operations have had a variety of effects on the 
world economy, but five transformational effects seem to have been particu-
larly important: " 
a' the establishment. of a neoliberal relationship between capital and labor 
across many of the world's economies; ,""" ";: 
b the attenuation of comparative advantage as a comprehensive explanation 
. ofwhy countries trade; , ."" ". ' " :" > 
C "' a change in post~re of the developing world toward TNC participation 
in their economies; 
d the re-organization: of the ownership structure of capital across the 
. "world; and, "0' . . 
e. 'a fundamental change in" the scope for "national politics in an increasingly 
globalized economy. 
Establislulletlt of a tieoliberalr~iaijollsl,;p between capital and labor, 
,- , ~ t. '- ~ .. -' 
Globalization is often understood as a process involving increasing integration 
between countries, peoples; and economies. However, t?is process of inteJZra-
tion through trade and capital movements has been an Important cause ?~ a 
parallel process involving the" disintegration of production ~nd ~omm~mt1es 
(Feenstra 1998). For most of the twentieth century pr~ductIon m. the mdus-
trialized countries was organized vertically in that mat~nals processmg and the 
early stages of goods manufacture were carried out m the same product1,:,e 
concerns and the same locales as final stage assembly of goods; However, .·I.n 
the 1970s in the US, under the pressure of increasing international competI-
tion, large manufacturers began to sub-contract separable stages of the 
-------------------------------------------------------; 
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production process to small, often non-unionized, highly competltlve, low 
profit firms:' This set a precedent for more extensive re-organization of the 
production process" or dis-integration of the value-chain, that was su~se­
quently acted upon by TNCs across international boundaries as trade barners 
came down in successive rounds of trade liberalization through the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and later the World Trade Organi-
zation(WTO). Indeed, enhanced information control methods through 
computers and lowered transportation costs made it possible for firms to sub-
contract whole stages. of the production process to producers across the 
world. Not only, then, was the production process itself fragmented and 
transformed, but the social communities tied to formerly integrated produc-
tion . sites .were fragmented and disrupted in an economic-social process 
widely understood as "deindustrialization" (Bluestone and Harrison 1982). 
US trade legislation originally facilitated this development through off-
shore assembly laws that restricted tariffs to. only the. foreign. value-adde~ on 
US components shipped abroad for further 'manhfacture' and ~ubsequent re~ 
import to the US (see US International Trade Commission 1997). A more 
recent worldwide development is the creation' of entire export· processing 
zones (EPZs) or foreign trade zones (FTZs) to which foreign goods can be 
shipped, further processed, and then re":exported without payment of normal 
duties and fees. These duty-free zones have become magnets for·FDI as 
countries have expanded them into industrial and science clusters supported 
by linked infrastructural and human capital iI1vestments. Interlocking global 
networks of these expanded EPZs increasingly constitute TNC-created inter-
national production systems in which semi-processed to final goods are 
shipped around the world multiple times to undergo different stages of 
manufacture according to national production advantages and government 
incentives. . 
The impact on organized labor, especially in the US and the UK, has been 
significant. Having given up bargaining for wage increases; in the period of 
general economic stagnation in the 1970s, trade unions made job retention 
their primary objective: But their efforts have only slowed the process of job 
loss as contracts expired, and firms closed down plants and. operations by 
~elocating them both domestically and internationally.· Since this often 
Involved the construction of new factories, and since it was believed by 111any 
in the US and the UK that much existing domestic productive capacity. was 
~bsolete in comparison with that of postwar Japan and Gemiany, new facto..:. 
neswe~e o.ften designed with new forms of flexible production. Flexible 
productIOn Involves having a capacity to re-structure and re-organize factory-:-
lev~l, shop-floor production methods to respond quickly and' efficiently .. to 
desIgn' changes in products necessitated by changing markets' and consumer 
tastes. From the point of view of labor, however, flexible production meant 
reduced commitments' on the part of firms to wage growth, benefits, and 
long-ternl, en:ployment. Firms defended this new stand by arguing that flexi-
ble prodl/ctlO/I In a world of competitive international markets implied a need 
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for flexible labor markets. Neoliberalism constituted the social ideology appro-
priate to this new state of affairs, because it explained individuals as independ-
ent and self-reliant, thereby undermining the view that employers and society 
more generally had any responsibilities toward employees. Thus an argument 
can be made that the emergence of neoliberalism at the end of the century is 
in large part a consequence of the development of ari international system of 
production organized by TNCs. " 
Attenuation of the comparative advantage expla~ation; of trad~ 
. ., ~ ,- ,- . . . 
Fcir over 175 years David Ricardo's logic of comparative advantage has been 
used to explain the basis for international trade~' Its full development came in 
the 1930s in the form of the .neoclassicalHeckscher-Ohlin theory; which 
explained that countries specialize in and' export go~ds that are intensive in 
resources or factors with which they were well endowed relative to their 
trade partners, while importing goods that are intensive in factors with'which 
their trade partners were relatively well-endowed. This scarcity-based con-
ception had as its chief achievement the explanation of the prices (or the 
terms of trade) at which goods m{ght be traded internationally. A principal 
assumption behind the theory dating from Ricardo's original explanation of 
the.' principle of comparative· advantage' is that. resources . are immobile 
between countries. When this .is. the case, countries can differ significantly in 
their resource endowments, and accordingly find it to their mutual advantage 
to trade with.one another;, The inobility and migration of capital through 
FDI, however, reduces resource endowment differences between countries, 
and raises the question whether new theories are needed to explain inter-
national trade. Indeed in the postwar period a number of new theories about 
the nature of international trade and the patterns of trade were advanced, 
including; ones: that emphasize imperfect competition, product cycles, 
economies of scale' and differences in tastes and incomes. 
For our purpos~s, however, more interesting is the increasing importance 
of the distinction between "ann's-length" trade and intra-firm trade. The 
fonner involves trade betweetl independent firms across national bounda~e~; 
and is the subject of standard trade theory. Thelatter involves trade wlth."l 
firnls across national boundaries, or more accurately' between a firm and Its 
foreign affiliates and subsidiaries in other countries, and thus falls outside the 
bounds of standard trade theory. "Arnl's-length" trade, because it is between 
independent firms, involves market: exchange and market prices. Intra-firm 
trade, by definition involves" administrative' decision-making' and, transfer 
prices. While the.l~gic of comparative advantage can be" applie~ to the 
fonner, it is not easily applied to the latter. TNCs employ transfer pn.c~s f~r a 
variety of reasons, inclilding' tax.: avoidance, . inter-unit cross-subSldlzatl.on 
strategies, . and accounting purposes. Though there i.s no comprehensIve 
theory of transfer pricing, the different explanations which have been otr:ered 
have very little in common with traditional comparative advantage analYSIS. 
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What is important about this distinction is that the increase. in the nu.mber 
of TNCs and the spread of their operations through FDI has mcreased l~tra­
finn trade as a share of total world trade. By some estimates, US trade SInce 
the early 1990s has become about 50 percent intra-firm trade, with US 
TNCs trading with their foreign affiliates and subsidiaries abroad, and non-
US TNCs trading with their foreign affiliates and subsidiaries in the US 
(Graham 1996: 14).4 The US case, however, differs from that of many other 
countries, since the strength of the US economy at the end of W orld War II 
led to an earlier emergence of outward FDI on the part of US TNCs. Thus, 
in the world as a whole, closer to a third of total imports and exports has 
been estimated to involve intra-finn trade (UNCTAD 1994). Arguably this 
share will continue to rise in the future, as TNCs from other countries 
become increasingly important, so that traditional trade theory will not only 
explain a decreasing share of world trade, but also fail to explain that type of 
trade arising from one of the most dynamic processes in recent years, the dra-
matic increase in TNC FDI activity. 
CI/aIlJ~e ill postllre of tile developing world toward TNCs 
When Hymer first initiated serious investigation into the subject of TNCs 
and FDI in 1960, developing countries by and large subscribed to the neo-
Marxist view that TNCs were agents of industrialized countries' imperialism. 
They reasoned that TNCs which were set up in their countries were engaged 
in a process of exploitation that involved removing more value than they 
created. Among the arguments for this were that resource extraction and 
agricultural production were carried out under agreements that paid far less to 
host countries than the value they created, that labor was paid wages lower 
than was paid in industrialized countries, that profits were always repatriated 
and never invested locally, and that host countries were compelled to subsi-
dize TNC infra-structural needs without adequate compensation. Indeed, to 
the extent that TNC FDI in developing countries in the postwar period until 
relatively recently was predominantly for resource extraction and agricultural 
production, there was some truth to many of these arguments. 
However, the increasing disintegration of manufacturing production in the 
industrialized countries (as explained above) has meant that recent FDI now 
involves a significant export of capital for manufacturing purposes. This com-
bined with higher rates of technical advance in manufacturing has meant that 
the location of new plants and factories through FDI typically involve 
technology spillovers to host countries. These may arise from the training of 
loca.l wO.rk forces to technology-sharing with local suppliers to "reverse" 
engmeenng learning opportunities created by the presence of new products 
an.d ~ethods. Developing Countries, then, have generally reversed their past 
thll1kll1g ~bout the presence of TNCs in their economies, and sought to 
compete lI1ternationally for FDI flows. s For a number of reasons, however, 
many countries (particularly in Africa) have to date been relatively unsuccess-
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ful: their relative states of underdevelopment have often made them costly 
locations for foreign firms, despite their low wages; markets to which TNCs 
expect to supply goods are concentrated in the industrialized countries, 
making location closer to those markets advantageous; and, technology gains 
to TNCs from locating where technical progress is high are unavailable in 
most developing countries. 
One important consequence of this is that growth rates between the 
advanced economies and the developing world continue to widen. More-
over, the fact that the extent and depth of poverty in the developing world 
seems to be becoming more intractable may.lead to .political instability, and 
thus create further disincentives to TNC operations and FDI there.' Thus 
while recent World Investment Reports indicate an increasing number of coun-
tries have significant inward FDI flows, they also show that the share of FDI 
going to the poorest nations and regions of the world su'ch as Africa is con-
stant or decreasing. With government-to-government aid a very limited 
source of development support at the end of the twentieth century, the 
lowest income developing countries face' particularly poor prospects for the 
future. 
Re-organization of the ownership structure OJ capi~al acr~si 'thewo;id 
Keynes argued in The General Theory (1936) that the first decades of the 
twentieth century saw a fundamental change in the way in which investment 
was carried out in the industrialized 'economies on account of the increasing 
separation of management and ownership in business firms. Whereas most 
firms at the end of the nineteenth century in the UK were owner-operated, 
in the space ofa :few decades professional managers had largely replaced 
owners, many of whom had lost their commitment to those firms in which 
they and their families had previously been involved. This increased the 
importance of stock exchanges as a vehicle for the pursuit of gain through the 
buying and selling of stocks by those who had inherited wealth - a new 
rentier class as Keynes termed it. Keynes's concern was that thiS. change had 
produced an increase in speculative activity in capitalist econom~es, .and that 
this led. to greater instability in business investment and greate~ hkehhood of 
business downturns. A parallel but slightly different state of affam can now be 
argued to obtain in the more globalized postwar world econo~y. Whereas 
Keynes's experience was that of the creation of a national rentler class, our 
present experience is that of the creation of an international rentier class ... ! . , 
One fundamental change in recent decades is the increased ease of acc.e~s 
for investors to different national stock exchanges and other property acqulSl-
tions, combined with a tendency toward centralization of national e.xc~anges 
across borders as international exchanges. Though there remains a sl~lfic~nt 
national bias in individuals' stock holdings, the tendency toward hberahzatlon 
of rules for foreign participation in national stock exchan.ge~ (for ~xample 
recently in Japan) opens up the possibility that the future Will mcreasmgly be 
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characterized bya class of international wealth-holders with little or no 
loyalty to 'any particular collection of national firms. This contrasts with 
Keynes's experience, where if investor, attachment to particular firms could 
no longer, be expected, nonetheless wealth-holders generally retained an 
attachment to national firms. Evidence' of the more general problem of 
capital mobility this can produce can be found in the ,1997 Asian financial 
crisis when large amounts of capital were quickly withdrawn from a number 
of the most dynamic East Asian economies when, exchange rate depreciations 
appeared to be at,' hand. In contrast to short-term portfolio capital flows, 
much of this involved capital that took the form of lending to Asian banks, 
which had then made loans to domestic firms, which in tum put up their 
equity as collateral (Eichengreen 1999). -However, ·as it turned out, this 
foreign 'lending typically included contractual "escape" clauses, whereby 
foreign lenders could demand immediate re-payment of loans from banks in 
the event of significant changes in key, national indicators, and banks were 
forced to demand repayment of the loans they had-made to their customers. 
Essentially, then, the Asian crisis. was. a product of the, mobility of highly 
footloose international capital in pursuit of gains unavailable in domestic 
markets. This suggests that international financial crises are likely to become 
more rather than less common in the future, with "contagion:' ris~sacross 
;, ",' '.":, -, -economies increasingly a problem. 
Fundamental cllange ;n tire scope for national politics " .,,' '! ., 
Oani Rodrik (2000) has argued that the world social-economic. system, is 
caught in an international trilemma involving fundamental choices over what 
form politics and economics will take in the future. His trilemma argument is 
that only two of the three following things can be combined in the future 
global system: survival of the nation state, the continuance of democratic or 
"mass" politics, and the integration of national economies. The' immediate 
postwar period combined the nation state and mass politics in what, Rodrik 
labels the Bretton Woods compromise. Global economic' integration was 
limited to what was compatible with there being relatively independent 
national economic policies, which themselves were 'generally responsive to 
popular political pressures. In particular, capital mobility was highly limited. 
The current period is closer to what has been called the "Golden Strait-
jacket" (Friedman 1999). Here it is mass politics which seems, to have, been 
curtailed as nations pursue liberalized trading regimes, and compete with one 
another for FOI, irrespective of whether this may involve job loss and erosion 
o~ social safety. Finally, a third possibility for the' future is that mass politics 
WIll be :e-estab~ished on a global, non-national basis through a variety' of 
types of Internatlonal political organizations, global economic integration will 
proceed apace, but the nation state will become increasingly irrelevant. ' 
What does the future hold in Rodrik's view? On the one hand, it seems 
that the world cannot go back to the past and the Bretton Woods compro-
--~ -- ----..- - -- ------..--~~-'----;;;-'----=-
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mise without significant disruption, since capital mobility and the' current 
more liberalized world trading regime have dramatically transformed almost 
all of the world's economies, while creating GOP growth resulting in higher 
per capita income levels in many countries. On the other hand, the scenario 
that Rodrik prefers - that politics become global to catch up with an eco-
nomic system that has become global - strikes him as utopian at the current 
point in time. This leaves the "Golden Straitjacket" which combines a glob-
alizing world economy with nation states in competition with one another. 
For Rodrik, however, this is an unstable and unlikely permanent outcome, 
since it sacrifices democratic and mass politics which are deeply' embedded in 
the history of the advanced economies. It also further threatens safety nets, 
and jeopardizes countries' cultural and social traditions. At the same time, 
nations~. competition with one another for trade and FOI will almost certainly 
continue. Thus how politics and economics combine in the future is unclear, 
and" perhaps the only thing one can be confident about is that the nation 
state will be a site of social conflict between those who regard it as a vehicle 
for countries' competition in the international economy and those who see it 
as having evolved not only as a democratic institution, but as the only 
significant means for democratic politics in the world today. 
In this -contest, TNCs are likely to be at the center of controversy. As 
intrinsically hierarchical institutions" they" share little with the democratic 
political' process. Yet as foreign firms they have a need to accommodate 
themselves to national priorities iri the countries in which they locate, sug-
gesting that they will at least attemptto engage national political constituen-
cies. One complicating '£lctor in this regard is the fact that many TNCs are 
economically close in size (measured in terms of sales) to the nations ~here 
they locate (measured' in, terms of GO P). Another complicating factor IS that 
as specifically niultinational' firms; TNCs have multiple allegiances. In any, 
event, what seems clear is that as agents of change in the global econo~y, 
TNCs will-continue to playa major role in the future fortunes of natIon 
states and democratic politics. 
, 
Conclusion 
Many see the dramatic increase in FOI and TNC activity as evidence that 
TNC' . 'h Id economy that are able 
s are relatively autonomous agents m t e wor 
to pursue their goals largely as they choose. But it may also be argued that 
TNCs are constrained,and influenced in considerable degree by governments 
and social-political interests that seek to act on agendas contrary to, TNC 
i , . a: - f h US government to dlscour-
n erests. One such example are the euorts 0 t e ," ' 
£i ' . " . C ba US Cuba-phobic age orelgn TNCs from carrying out actIVItIes m u . . 
policies have :been contested not only by foreign TNCs but also by. t~elr 
, . £fil' f US TNCs wlshmg 
source-country governments. Further, foreign a 1 tates o. . 
t db' .' dd 'th US foreign pohcy. Thus, 
o 0 usmess in Cuba find themselves at 0 s WI 
h TNC often find themselves rat er than being relatively autonomous agents, s 
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in circumstances such as these being caught up in conflicts between coun-
tries. Another example concerns NGO groups worldwide that seek to 
achieve their goals on a variety of social and environmental issues by applying 
pressure to TNCs. Since TNCs are often the visible agents of change in the 
countries in which they operate, NGOs have frequently worked to change 
the character of TNC operations and practices, especially when host coun-
tries themselves are reluctant to do so. These and other examples suggest that 
TNCs may often find themselves involved in operations less profitable and 
successful than originally anticipated when the FDI that created them was 
undertaken. In this regard they may well be worse off than domestic firms 
whose political support in their home countries is generally stronger. One 
might suppose that these types of insecurity would lead to TNCs being more 
mobile and less committed to long-term involvements in their foreign loca-
tions. Against this is the fact that long-term commitments are usually 
extracted in one fornl or another by host countries interested in stable eco-
nomic growth, and that FDI investments are by nature long-term. Thus 
TNCs have important sources of social and political vulnerability that argues 
for a more moderate view of their autonomy in the world economy. 
A final issue in regard to the influence that governments and countries have 
vis-a-vis TNCs concerns possible changes in the structure of world trade. His-
torically world trade has been dominated by trade. in intermediate rather than 
final goods, reflecting national differences in countries' resource endowments 
and greater degrees of manufacturing development in the industrialized coun-
tries. But increasingly - with lower worldwide transportation and communica-
tion costs - production processes that transform intermediate goods into final 
goods are "footloose" or mobile among countries with newly industrializing 
economies (especially in EPZs) seizing larger shares of this type of production. 
Partly this reflects the greater importance of the "product cycle" in the devel-
opment of goods across international markets, and partly it reflects, the 
improved infrastructural capacities of the newly industrializing economies that 
were previously unattractive sites for FDI and new TNC operations. What this 
implies from a trade theory perspective is that the principle of comparative 
advantage - which has greater scope when international markets trade final 
goods - has now to be accompanied by the emphasis on the prin:cipl~ of 
absolute advantage, where this concerns relative labor costs and the provision of 
social overhead capital. Countries, then, that are low in the former respect and 
~ore able to address the latter stand to gain in capturing "footloose"produc-
tlOn. This trend is likely to be reinforced as the advanced countries seek to be 
spe~ialized in the most technologically sophisticated goods, thus giving up their 
earlier co.ncentra~ion in more "mature" final goods whose technologies are 
more ~aslly copIed by new producers. What, this· development implies for 
TNCs IS that ~hey will be pursued actively by newly industrializing economies 
that seek to clunb the ladder of industrial development. TNC production affili-
at~s offer faster start-ups than home-grown firms, and with' technological 
spIllovers leave pennanent improvements in domestic production capacity. 
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TNCs, therefore, will likely experience an increasing importance in the 
world economy combined with greater controversy over their roles' in host 
countries. Their central role in globalization is now fully recognized;an"d 
many across the world today see them as the source of problems andlor as an 
opportunity for leveraging the process of globalization. This integration" into 
future political, social, and developmental scenarios makes a f~llyeconomic 
analysis of TNCs shortsighted. Rather TNCs need to understood in political~ 
economic terms, influencing and being influenced by the changing socialand 
political organization and evolution of the international economy. 
Notes 
* The author is grateful for comments on previousversio~s of this chapterto Joseph 
Daniels, Phil O'Hara, and Marc von der Ruhr." ' 
1 In addition, TNCs carry out activities associated with a variety of types non-equity 
relationships (e.g. joint ventures, international subcontracting, licensing, contract 
manufactures) that indicate further impact. ' 
2 However, the small share of world FD I, going to less developed countries is prc-
dominantly greenfield investment. This reflects higher levels, of investment in 
primary product industries, and the smaller numbers of firms in less developed 
countries that might be acquired. '" , ,,' " ' 
3 Thus M&A FDI does not generate substantial employment gains. The smaller share 
of FD I in the form of greenfield investment does increase employm~nt. 
4 ~his has interesting implications for. the US trade defici~, smce It means t?at a 
Significant share of the large volume of imports that contnbutes to that defiCit are 
produced by the foreign affiliates of US firms that export goods ?ack to the US. 
That is, in part' the trade deficit is due to US firms selling to theIr US custom~rs 
from foreign locations rather than domestic ones, suggesting that the US appetite 
£i "e .". . I . £i "US" goods produced 
,or lOrelgn goods IS to some extent SllllP Y an appetite or 
III foreign locations. . 
5 One factor in this rcg:ml has becn widespread abandonment o~ ,the Import-
substitution paradigm of dcvelopmcnt in favor of the export-competltlve~ess para-
d' FI)' . ' rt platforms Chma IS an Igm. ,I IS secn as thc easlcst way to create expo . 
excellent cxamplc in this respect. 
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